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PAYEE AS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE

MAY THE PAYEE OF A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
BE A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE?
By LESTER W. FEEZER*
iE controversy as to whether or not, under the Uniform
Iegotiable Instruments Law, a payee may be a holder in due
course continues to produce its grist of cases from year to year.
As was said by the Tennessee court in one of the most recent cases
involving the question:' "All hope for a uniform construction of
this section 2 has now become vain." The problem must therefore
be considered as this court suggests, by the application of the
ordinary rules of statutory interpretation s and also in the light of
the requirements of commercial practice.
To reiterate the suggestion in the title, the fundamental question of law to be discussed in this paper is this: First, can a named
payee in a negotiable instrument ever be a "holder in due course"
within the meaning of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,
and by virtue of his status as such, entitled to the peculiarly
favored position of the ordinary bona fide purchaser of a negotiable instrument who is not named therein? Second, if this be
answered in the affirmative, are there any limitations upon the
circumstances under which the payee may enjoy the benefits of
being a "holder in due course" other than those affecting a holder
to whom such an instrument is indorsed by the named payee?
Conversely stated: Is one who satisfies, in other respects, the
conditions of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, particularly section 52, disqualified from being a holder in due course
because he happens to be the named payee ?*Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Dakota, Vermillion,
South Dakota.
'Snyder v. McEwen, (1923) 148 Tenn. 423, 256 S. W. 434.
'Section 52 Uniform N. I. L. This section provides as follows: "A
holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the
following conditions:

1. That it is complete and regular upon its face;
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without
notice that it had been dishonored, if such was the fact;
3. That he took it in good faith and for value;

4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it."
'Snyder v. McEwen, (1923) 148 Tenn. 423, 256 S. W. 434, holds that
a payee may be a holder in due course under N. I. L.
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The cases involving this problem seem to be subject to classification in three groups:
1. Those which hold that the payee of a negotiable instrument
may not be a holder in due course thereof, because the instrument
has not been negotiatedto him.5
2. Those which hold that a payee may be a holder in due
course and which place him practically on a parity with any other
holder whose name does not appear on the instrument except as
incident to a transfer by indorsement 6
3. Those which hold that a payee may be a holder in due
course where such named payee takes the instrument "from a
holder (not the maker) to whom it was negotiated as a com'7
pleted instrument.
The present writer adopts the view that a payee of a negotiable instrument may be a holder in due course where the circumstances are otherwise such as would bring an endorsee within the
definition of "holder in due course" in section 52 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law. Moreover there is nothing elsewhere in the Uniform Act which opposes an insurmountable
obstacle to this interpretation. The following reasons may then
be given as important arguments for this view. First; The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law may reasonably be interpreted
as intending that a payee may achieve the status of holder in due
course. Second; That result is in accord with the prevailing view
at common law. Third; It is highly desirable that the payee
should be able to qualify as a "holder in due course" because that
'See also section 54, 55, 56, 59, N. I. L. for other provisions referring
to circumstances affecting the holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.
'Among the cases frequently cited as holding that a holder in due
course can be only a holder who takes by negotiation from the payee, some
were decided largely upon facts involving section 14 or section 16 N. I. L.
and have been qualified, or limited or distinguished in later decisions.
Still others so holding do not refer in any way to the Negotiable Instruments Law and cannot be regarded as important authorities for this proposition. See Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law, 3rd Ed., page 49 et seq.
See infra text and notes 45, 46, 47, 48, and 49 for reference to authorities so holding.
'Outstanding among the cases so holding for the reasoning employed
are probably Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, (1914) 217 Mass. 462, 105 N. E.
605, L. R. A. 1915B 144, and in England the opinion of Fletcher Moulton,
L. J., in Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke, [1907] 1 K. B. 794, 76 L. J. K. B. 666,
96 L. T. 715, 23 T. L. R. 429.. Other cases so holding include, Snyder
v. McEwen, (1923) 148 Tenn. 423, 256 S.W. 434; Ex parte Goldberg
& Lewis, (1914) 191 Ala. 356, 67 So. 839, L. R. A. 1915F 1157. See also

notes 54, 55 and 56.
'Bank of Commerce & Savings v. Randell, (1921) 107 Neb. 332, 186
N. W. 70, 21 A. L. R. 1360.
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position is in accord with both commercial practice and commercial convenience. Fourth; It is the view which represents the
weight of authority today and is supported by what appear to be
the better reasoned cases since the adoption of the Negotiable
Instruments Law. Fifth; In some instances at least the maker
or other party sought to be charged upon the instrument will be
estopped by his conduct in connection with the execution and
delivery of the instrument to deny that the payee is a "holder in
due course," or, at any rate, that he is entitled to recover upon it.,
This problem has first presented itself in a number of jurisdictions complicated by circumstances calling for the determination of other questions and the application and interpretation of
other provisions of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,
than those sections bearing strictly upon this problem of the
payee's status as holder in due course. Some of the better known
cases on this topic have involved instruments which were not
completed by the maker and in which blanks have been filled by
some intermediary party in violation of his authority or otherwise
without the authority of the maker or other party sought to be
charged and after the instrument has left the hands of such party
or else have been the subject of an unauthorized delivery by some
intermediary. 9 Hence a number of these cases have involved the
points dealt with in sections 14 and 16 of the Uniform Act and
sometimes also involve questions relative to the nature and extent
of the agency of such intermediary.' 0
Prof. Underhill Moore has pointed out at some length that in
connection with the problems of the nature dealt with in this discussion both the American Negotiable Instruments Law and the
British Bills of Exchange Act treat these problems from the
'Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke, [1907J 1 K. B. 794, 76 L. J. K. B. 666, 96
L. T. 715, 23 T. L. R. 429; Peoples State Bank v. Snyder, (N. D. 1924)
195 N. W. 436; Security Bank v. Foster, (Tex. 1923) 249 S. W. 227, states
that payee herein is and may be a holder in due course even though the
intermediary delivered the instrument in violation of his authority from
the makers, but that it is immaterial whether he be a holder in due course or
not as he is protected by estoppel, citing Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke, [1907]
1 K. B. 794, 76 L. J. K. B. 666, 96 L. T. 715, 23 T. L. R. 429.
'Empire Trust Co. v. Bank of Manhattan Co., (1916) 97 N. Y. Misc.
694, 162 N. Y. S. 629, wherein it was held that the payee was not the
holder in due course of an instrument which he took in good faith and for
value from a thief, on the ground that the instrument had not been completed by delivery with the drawer's intent that it should take effect as
a completed and negotiable instrument. This case is criticized, 1 MiNNESOTA LAW RsvIw 446, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 515, 17 Col. L. Rev. 566.
'The questions of agency which may be involved in this problem are
discussed by Prof. Moore in the article cited, viz., at 20 Col. L. Rev. 749.
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standpoint of the innocent (stranger) purchaser and do not treat
of the payee's claim or of the remitter and his rights. 1 Prof.
Moore believes that at least the bona fide purchaser from the
apparent owner of true remittable paper, for example, bank drafts,
whether he be payee or indorsee, should be protected as a holder
in due course. But Prof. Moore would limit this protection to cases
of what he considers true remittable paper, including bank drafts
and such other instruments as are extensively remitted. He
would not include checks. This view would apparently establish
a more restricted classification than the third one referred to
above" in some respects; but, if the instrument be true "remittable
paper" the payee would be treated as well as any other holder in
due course and would come within the second of the classifications referred to."
At common law it was the general rule that the payee of a
negotiable bill of exchange or promissory note could be a holder
thereof in due course if he acquired the instrument before maturity, in good faith, for value and without notice of defenses available to the maker, acceptor, drawer or irregular indorser, as against
the intermediary or remitter from whose hands he received it.'4
"The remitter most common is one who has purchased or borrowed

a bill or note payable to someone else, with the assent of the drawer,
maker, acceptor or irregular indorser in order that the remitter may use
it for his own benefit." Moore, 20 Col. L. Rev. 749.
'Page 102.
'It does not seem to the present writer that the protection of a payee
of a negotiable instrument as a holder in due course should be made to
depend upon the instrument being of the sort extensively used for remitting. The extent of the custom of remitting personal checks is a variable
quantity in different localities but it'is extremely common and seems to
be growing, at least in the middle west. The number of cases in which
the question of the payee's rights has come even before courts of last
resort for determination serves to illustrate the frequency and variety of
circumstances in which checks are so used. But it is the argument of this
paper that the rights of the payee need not be sustained merely on the
ground that the particular instrument in which he is interested is of a type
customarily used for remitting payments between debtor and creditor.
Indeed the bona-fide-purchasers-payees of promissory notes, which of
course are not at all frequently used for this purpose are treated as holders
in due course in some of the leading cases on this side of the controversy.
Bank of Commerce v. Randell, (1921) 107 Neb. 332, 186 N. W. 70, 21 A. L.
R. 1365; Ex parte Goldberg & Lewis, (1914) 191 Ala. 356, 67 So. 839,
L. R. A. 1915F 1157; Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, (1914) 217 Mass. 462,
105 N. E. 605, L. R. A. 1915B 144. As to checks in this connection see
particularly Boston Steel & Iron Co. v. Steuer, (1903) 183 Mass. 140, 66
N. E. 646.
"Watson v. Russell, (1862) 3 B. & S. 34; Armstrong v. Exchange
Nat. Bank, (1890) 133 U. S.433, 10 S.C. R. 450, 33 L. Ed. 747; Munroe
v. Bordier, (1849) 8 Com. B. 862, 19 L. J. C. P. 133, 15 L. T. 0. S.5, 15
Jur. 507; Fullerton v. Sturgis, (1855) 4 Ohio St. 530; Cagle v. Lane,
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Under the modern statutes codifying the law merchant, this
point seems to have been judicially referred to in England for the
first time in Lewis v. Clay,"5 in which case Lord Russell of Killowen said by way of dictum, "A 'holder in due course' is a person
to whom, after its completion by, and as between the immediate
parties, the bill or note has been negotiated." This dictum then
at least infers that delivery between original or immediate parties
is not negotiation. The question was first fairly presented in
England however, in Herdman v. Wheeler 6 in 1902. This case is
the source to which must be traced the view now so extensively
established in this country. In this case the defendant, the Rev.
Mr. Wheeler, having arranged with one A to secure a loan for
him, signed and gave to A a blank form with authority to fill it
up as a note for £15. A, in violation of this authority, fraudulently filled up the paper as a promissory note for £30, inserting
plaintiff's name as payee. A then sold the note to the plaintiff,
who gave value for it in good faith and without notice that it had
been signed in blank. A then misappropriated the proceeds. It
was held that the delivery of the note by A to the plaintiff was not
a negotiation within the meaning of section 20, subsection 2, of the
Bills of Exchange Act 7 so as to entitle plaintiff to recover.
Herdnan v. Wheeler "'8 involves the abuse of authority to fill
blanks, by the person intrusted with the instrument by the maker,
but in this case the note was filled out and was complete on its
face before it came to the notice of the plaintiff. Therefore, if
plaintiff was, in other respects, a holder in due course, he was
not disqualified from enforcing it for the full amount under the
jrovisions of section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law or
section 20 of the British Act. In Herdinan v. Wheeler the court
said that it was not holding that a payee could never be a holder
in due course and added that it was unnecessary to decide that
point. In this connection the court says; "Even if the payee may
be a holder in due course, the question whether he is, depends
(1887) 49 Ark. 465, 5 S. W. 790; Fairbanks v. Snow, (1887) 145 Mass.

153, 13 N. E. 596; Jordan v. Jordan, (1882) 10 Lea 124, 43 A. S. R. 294;
Lookout Bank v. Aull, (1894) 93 Tenn. 645, 27 S. W. 1014, 42 A. S. R. 934.
Contra are three cases in Nebraska prior to the adoption of the N. I. L.
in that state. See note 31 for references.
" (1897 67 L. J. Q. B. 224, 77 L. T. 653, 14 T. L. R. 149, 46 W. R. 319.
16[1902] 1 K. B. 361, 18 T. L. R. 190, 71 L. J. K. B. 270, 86 L. T. 48,
50 W.
R. 300.
T
Sec. 14, 1N.K.I. L.
2[1902]
B. 361, 18 T. L. R. 190, 71 L. J. K. B. 270, 86 L. T. 48,
50 W. R. 300.
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upon the actual state of facts as between him and the maker."
The rest of the opinion does not altogether satisfy one as to what
facts were present in the case to bring it within the application of
the above quoted statement, nor why the court found it necessary
to express its regret, that to hold the other way would strain the
meaning of the words "negotiate" and "issue" as used in the
statute. The case has been the subject to some criticism, not only
in contradictory decisions but in reviewer's notes and text book
comments involving this point.19
The question next arose in England in Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke in
1907, the result of which was contrary to Herdman v. Wheeler."'
The principal opinion in this case attempted to distinguish Herdman v. Wheeler on the ground that in Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke the
defendant was estopped to deny to the plaintiff, who was bona
fide purchaser-payee, the intermediary's authority to fill up the
blank as it was filled up when it reached the plaintiff. Lord Justice
Fletcher-Moulton, however, in his concurring opinion baldly disagrees with Herdman v. Wheeler, saying that the view expressed
in that case involves taking *the position that it was the intent of
the Bills of Exchange Act to change the well settled rule at common law.
At least two other English cases are of some importance in
this connection; Smith v. Prosser,22 in which the estoppel rule as
laid down in Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke was held not to apply in
circumstances where there was never a delivery of the instrument
with intent that it take effect as a negotiable instrument. In this
case the maker left two blank signed note forms with his agent
to be filled out and issued only upon his sending specific instruc"Brannan, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 49 et seq,; Henning, The
Negotiable Instruments Law, Is it Producing Uniformity? 59 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 471, 479; 15 Harv. L. Rev. 579; Norton, Bills and Notes, 4th Ed.,
344 note 62.
"[1907] 1 K. B. 794, 76 L. J. K. B. 666, 96 L. T. 715, 23 T. L. R. 429.
The defendant had signed his name on a piece of blank stamped paper
and bad entrusted the paper to another person with authority to fill it up
as a promissory note. for a specified amount payable to plaintiff as security
for an advance made by plaintiff in the form of an overdraft. The person to whom it was so entrusted filled it up for a larger amount and
obtained the larger amount from the plaintiff who had no notice of the
fraud. The court in resting its decision on the ground of estoppel said
that the doctrine of estoppel had not been affected in its application to such
facts as these, either by the Bills of Exchange Act or by the decision in
Herdman v. Wheeler.
"[1902] 1 K. B. 361, 18 T. L. R. 190, 71 L. J. K. B. 270, 86 L. T. 48,
50 W. R. 300.
"[1907] 2 K. B. 735, 77 L. J. K. B. 71, 97 L. T. 155, 23 T. L. R. 597,
I1 Ann. Cas. 191.
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tions. The maker then went abroad, and the agent without any
such instructions filled up the notes and sold them for value to
plaintiff after inserting plaintiff's name as payee. Plaintiff acted
in good faith but it was held that estoppel did not apply in his
favor here because there never was a negotiable instrument of
the defendants' making in existence, since there had been no
authority to issue any at all and, that, as the plaintiff knew of the
agency status of the person from whom he purchased the notes.
23
he was chargeable with notice as to the limits of his authority.
It is submitted that this last circumstance controls the situation
as matter of agency and notice without laying down any rule of
general application in the law of negotiable instruments.
Talbot v. Boris24 indirectly involved the question of payee as
25
holder in due course. In applying the British equivalent of
section 59, sub-section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law relative to the burden of showing that the plaintiff is a holder in due
course it was held that this question was not applicable to a case
where the instrument was in the hands of the person to whom
issued.

26

"Awde v. Dixon, (1851) 6 Exch. 869, 20 L. J. Ex. 295, 17 L. T. 0. S.
189; Empire Trust Co. v. Bank of Manhattan Co., (1916) 97 N. Y. Misc.
694, 162 N. Y. S. 629 discussed in note 9; See also Apostoloff v. Levy,
(N. Y. 1918) 170 N. Y. S. 930. In this latter case plaintiff drew a check
payable to order of the defendant, a stock broker, and handed it to a third
party with instructions to deliver it to defendant as margin on a certain
short sale. The third party delivered it to the defendant on a transaction
of his own and later received from defendants the amount standing to his
credit on a short sale which he directed them to make on his own account.
Held: the third party had no apparent title to the check and for that reason
the brokers were liable to the plaintiff.

See also Hathaway v. Delaware

Co., (1906) 185 N. Y. 368, 373, 78 N. E. 153. The case also cites one of the

earlier Nebraska cases holding that a payee could not be a holder in due
course, viz. Camp v. Sturtevant. (1884) 16 Neb. 693, 21 N. W. 449. See
also, Eliason State Bank v. Montevideo Baseball Ass'n, (Minn., 1924)
200 N. W. 300.
'[1911J 1 K. B. 854, 80 L. J. K. B. 661, 104 L. T. 524, 27 T. L. R. 226.
'Section 59, N. I. L. clause 1, "Every holder is deemed prima facie
to be a holder in due course but when it is shown that the title of any
person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is
on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims
acquired the title as holder in due course." Compare Bills of Exchange
Act, section 30 (2) "But if in an action on a bill it is admitted or proved
that the acceptance, issue or subsequent negotiation of the bill is affected
with fraud, duress or force and fear or illegality, the burden of proof is
shifted, unless and until the holder proves that, subsequent to the alleged
fraud or illegality, value has in good faith been given for the bill."
'The cases above referred to and Watson v. Russell (1864), 3 B. &
S. 34 are discussed by Mr. A. M. Hamilton in 24 Juridical Review 41. In
this article Mr. Hamilton takes the position of Herdman v. Wheeler and
concludes that under both common law and the Bills of Exchange Act
the view that a payee cannot be, or at least is not a holder in due course
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In the light of the few decisions under the British Bills of
Exchange Act, some writers express the view that the English
law is uncertain 27 as to whether a payee can be a holder in due
course, others appear to be satisfied that the effect of Lloyd's Bank
v. Cooke is to establish the rule that the payee may be a holder in
due course.

28

The American cases are in irreconcilable conflict, although certain jurisdictions have repeatedly asserted one view or the other
so that the law may be regarded as settled in those particular
states. 29 As has already been stated, these cases may be classified
in two or possibly three groups. At common law, in this country
as in England, the generally accepted view was that a payee of
a negotiable instrument might be a holder in due course."0 The
only jurisdiction having clear decisions to the contrary, prior to
the adoption of the Neg'otiable Instruments Law, was Nebraska. 1
That jurisdiction, however, in construing the uniform law has announced the view that a payee is a holder in due course,3 2 where
is the better one. He says: "The relation between immediate parties
is simply one of contract. [See page 111 this article.] It is
difficuit to see why a different principle should be applied when the person professing to act, say for the maker of a note, happens to be not
an ordinary agent but a person desiring accommodation, an agent 'ad hoc'
proposing to make money by his wits, or some other interested party, or
when the agent is entrusted with the completing of the bill."
This reasoning is of course a repetition of part of the reasoning in
Herdman v. Wheeler in which case the court approved the argument of
counsel that as between the original parties to it, the note is governed
by the ordinary law of contracts other than the law merchant and hence
that the element of negotiability does not enter into the case .as between
maker and payee. That this involves putting the payee of a non-negotiable
instrument in a better position than the payee of one which is negotiable is
pointed out in the footnote on page 345, Norton, Bills and Notes 4th Ed.
'20 Mich. L. Rev. 908, Joyce, Defenses to Commercial Paper 897.
'1
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446, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 515 Brannan, The

Neg. Inst. Law, 3rd Ed., 51 et seq.
:'For collections of authorities to date thereof see Annotation at 15
American Law Reports 437 and 21 A. L. R. 1365; Brannan, The Neg.
Insts. Law 3rd Ed., 49-52 and 162.
The authorities are also very fully collected in a number of the cases.
See among the more recent containing a particularly full collection and
discussion of the cases in point: Am. Nat. Bank v. Kerley, (1923) 109
Ore. 155, 220 Pac. 116.
'Armstrong v. Am. Exch. Nat'l Bank of Chicago, (1890) 133 U. S. 443,
33 L. Ed. 747, 10 S. C. R. 450; Fairbanks v. Snow, (1887) 145 Mass. 153,
13 N. E. 596; Cagle v. Lane, (1887) 49 Ark. 465, 5 S. W. 790.
'Charlton Plow Co. v. Davidson, (1884) 16 Neb. 374, 20 N. W. 256;
Vorce v. Rosenburg, (1882) 12 Neb. 448, 11 N. W. 879; Camp v. Sturtevant, (1884) 16 Neb. 693, 21 N. W. 449.
'Bank of Commerce v. Randell, (1921) 107 Neb. 332, 186 N. W. 70,
21 A. L. R. 1360. Farmers' State Bank of Craig v. Lydick, (Neb., 1924)
200 N. W. 50.
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he has taken the instrument from a holder, not the nzaker, to whom
it was negotiated as a completed instrument.33
The leading American case holding that a payee may not be
a holder in due course under the statute is Vander Ploeg v. Van
Zuuk.3 ' This case was decided in Iowa in 1907 on the authority
of Herdnzan v. Wheeler.35 This case was decided in the same
year as Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke 36 and evidently without the latter
case having been brought to the court's attention.3 7 In the Vander
Ploeg Case as in both Herdmnan v. Wheeler and Lloyds Bank v.
Cooke, the situation was complicated by the fact that the instrtiment left the hands of the party sought to be charged, with blanks
unfilled. Hence, under section 14 of the Uniform. Negotiable
Instruments Law, the purchaser to achieve the status of holder in
due course (whether he be payee or not) must have acquired the
instrument only after it was filled up or he is charged with notice
of the nature and extent of the authority of the intermediary party
from whom he acquired it.3a This is true of any purchaser who
takes the instrument while incomplete whether he be the named
payee or an indorsee3 9 In the Iowa case the court first tells us
that we have the simple case of a note wrongfully filled out and
delivered to the payee who is without notice of the wrongdoing. 4
It is pointed out that the question is governed by section 14 of the
uniform act and that plaintiff is entitled to recover if he is holder
in due course. Later in the opinion the court says plaintiff is not
a holder in due course because he did not get the instrument by
negotiation as required by section 52. Still later we are told
'This

of course involves the adoption of the broader meaning of the

word "negotiated" in the N. I. L. Or at least admits that the reference
to negotiation by indorsement in section 30 N. I. L. must be regarded as
defining a way but not necessarily the only way in which such an instrument may be negotiated.
"Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, (1907) 135 Ia. 350, 112 N. W. 807, 13
L. R. A. (N. S.) 490.
"[1902] 1 K. B. 361, 18 T. L. R. 190, 71 L. J. K. B. 270, 86 L. T. 48,
50 W. R. 300.
[1907] 1 K. B. 794, 76 L. 3. K. B. 666, 96 L. T. 715, 23 T. L. R. 429.
'See Henning, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Is it Producing Uniformity? 59 Pa. Law Rev. 471, 479 and discussion in Brannan, The Negotiable Instruments Law pages 49-52 and 162.
'Boston Steel and Iron Co. v. Stuer, (1903) 183 Mass. 140, 66 N.E. 646.
This case reviewed 15 Harv. L. Rev. 596.
"'Guerrant v. Guerrant, 7 Va. L. Reg. 639, Brannan page 48. Norton,
Bills and Notes, 3rd Ed., note 63 at page 346.
'In Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, (1907) 135 Ia. 350, 112 N. W. 807,
13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 490, the payee did not acquire or see the instrument
until the blanks had been filled and had no notice that it had left the
hands of the defendant while incomplete.
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that the real reason which led the court to this decision was the
change in-the law, effected by the uniform statute under the provisions (not of section 52) of section 14. In other words we have
this inconsistent line of reasoning: First, section 14 will not prevent plaintiff from recovering if he is a holder in due course.
Second he is not a holder in due course because of section 52
(which by the way is not accused of changing the common law
rule at all). Third and last, plaintiff could have recovered at common law but cannot under section 14 because Lord Russell said
4
so in his dictum in Lewis v. Clay. '
The Iowa case does not say that a payee can never be a holder
in due course, and in fact suggests that he might be so in some
cases, but it does after all put the decision on the ground that the
plaintiff took the instrument, although he was a bona fide purchaser
under section 14, not by "negotiation" but by delivery to him as
the named payee. This case thinks that the payee of a complete
bank draft acquiring it for value from the remitter may be a holder
in due course, delivery having taken place when the remitter got
it from the bank and negotiation when the remitter sold it to the
payee. In short here we have the dictum for the third classification already referred to, and followed in the Nebraska case of
42
Bank of Commerce v. Randell.
It seems to the writer that nothing of importance has been
added to the argument of Herdman v. Wheeler and Vander Ploeg
v. Van Zuuk by other cases taking that position and those which
do so hold are after all driven to the necessity of resting their
conclusion upon the construction which shall be placed upon the
single word "negotiated" as used in section 52 of the Uniform act.
Section 14 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law does
change the law to the extent that it requires the purchaser of
a negotiable instrument with an unfilled blank to inquire as to the
nature and extent of the authority of the. intermediate party who
was intrusted with the instrument in this form, 43 but it makes no
distinction between payees and other bona-fide purchasers, and,
where such purchaser acquires it after it is filled up, he has the
usual rights of a holder in due course. The trouble arises over the
word "negotiated," but the presence and meaning of the word in
this section would not have caused this trouble if the misconcept(1897) 67 L. J. Q. B. 224, 77 L. T. 653, 14 T. L. R. 149, 46 W. R. 319.

*'(1921)
107 Neb. 332, 186 N. W. 70, 21 A. L. R. 1360.
' 3See note 39.
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tion of Lewis v. Clay had not been in the books. But the Iowa
court having this misconception in mind devised an argument, with
the aid of Herdman v. Wheeler to sustain it, and, having this
precedent before them, other courts have taken it as a basis for
the extreme view entirely excluding the payee from the possibility
of being a holder in due course.
Herdnmn v. Wheeler and the Iowa case both use language
relative to the situation between immediate parties being governed
by the law of simple contract and make the argument apply to the
payee in his dealing with the maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser.
This argument is evidently adverted to as a prop to sustain a reading of the statute which was naturally somewhat repugnant to an
inherent sense of equity. Even so it is beside the point for three
reasons; in the first place it was not the rule prior to the adoption
of the modern statutes; secondly, the negotiability of an instrument having been established, it is not, strictly speaking, governed
by the law of simple contract at all. The law of simple contract
has always been the law of the common law courts, the king's
courts. The law of negotiable instruments on the other hand is
the law merchant. Since its adoption into the common law system,
to be sure, its basic principles have been somewhat colored by mixing with them such common-law doctrines as "consideration," "the
parol evidence rule" and "estoppel," but on the whole the unique
principles of the law merchant have been preserved; thirdly the
parties are not necessarily immediate unless they are made so by
the very interpretation of the word "negotiated" which is the point
in question; they were not so regarded prior to the statute, and
hence to call them so is begging the question.44
Several states seem to have committed themselves to the Iowa
interpretation of the term "negotiated" at least, and one or two
have apparently given this interpretation the extreme effect of
completely excluding the payee from the status of holder in due
course.

These states are Iowa, 45 Kentucky,"

Missouri,4 7 Okla-

""In the final analysis this difference of judicial opinion arises from
the different constructions placed upon the word "negotiated" in section
7844 Oregon Laws (section 52, N. I. L.) when taken in connection with

other sections of the statute." American National Bank v. Kerley, (1923)

109 Ore.
155, 220 Pac. 116, 126.
' 3Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, (1907) 135 Ia. 350, 112 N. W.
L. R. A. (N. S.) 490; Devoy & Kuhn Coal Co. v. Huttig, (1916)
357, 156 N. W. 413; Builders Lime and Cement Co. v. Weimer,
170 Ia. 444, 151 N. W. 100, Ann. Cas. 1917C 1174.
'S. N. Life Realty Co. v. Peoples Bank of Bardstown, (1917)

807, 13
174 Ia.
(1915)
178 Ky.
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homa48 and South Dakota. 49 Nebraska" has adopted the intermediate position which already has been referred to and which
was suggested in Vander Ploeg v. Van Zsutk. One case in Oregon"' and one in Washington 52 have been read and referred to by
some as sustaining the broad proposition that a payee may not be
a holder in due course but both of these cases have been limited if
not overruled in their respective jurisdictions by later decisions
clearly holding that a payee may be a holder in due course. 3
80, 85, 198 S. W. 543; First Nat. Bank v. Utterback, (1917) 177 Ky. 76,
197 4S. W. 534, L. R. A. 1915B 838.
St. Charles Savings Bank v. Edwards, (1912) 243 Mo. 553, 147 S.
W. 978; Long v. Shafer, (1914) 185 Mo. App. 641, 171 S. W. 690; Long v.
Mason, (1918) 273 Mo. 266, 200 S. W. 1062.
'FirstNat. Bank v. Allen, (1923) 88 Okla. 162,212 Pac. 597. Former cashier of bank had defaulted. Defendants were his relatives. A third party, as
agent for the bank, (according to the finding of the court below) procured the defendants to execute the note in suit in order to save their
relative, the defaulting cashier, from criminal prosecution. Held the bank
is not a holder in due course. The supreme court says, "we are doubtful whether the record sustains the finding that Patton was the bank's
agent, but it does not follow that the judgment should be reversed." The
court proceeds to find that the plaintiff bank gave no consideration for
the note and hence states that even if as payee the bank could be a
holder in due course, it was not such in this case because of the lack
of consideration. Elsewhere in its opinion however the court flatly
declares that the payee as such cannot be a holder in due course.
From what has been said it will be apparent that the statement that
a payee cannot be a holder in due course is 'purely dictum. However in
a later case of Strother v. Wilkinson, (1923) 90 Okla. 247, 216 Pac. 436,
this court relying on the above holds that a payee as such is not capable
of being a holder in due course, and hence approves the admission of
evidence as to transactions between original parties of which plaintiff had
no notice. These cases were followed as conclusive authority upon the
Oklahoma court in Rice et al v. Jones, (Okla. 1924) 225 Pac. 958.
'Britton Milling Co. v. Williams, (1921) 44 S. D. 464, 184 N. W. 265,
21 A. L. R. 1353; Tripp State Bank v. Jerke, (1922) 45 S. D. 448, 187 N.
W. 314.
'See note 32.
"Bank of Gresham v. Walsh, (1915) 76 Ore. 272, 147 Pac. 534.
"Bowles v. Fraser, (1910) 59 Wash. 336, 109 Pac. 812.
'American National Bank v. Kerley, (1923) 109 Ore. 155, 220 Pac. 116,
holds that a payee may be a holder in due course and while, the facts did
not necessarily involve the application of this rule in the same situation
as was involved in Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, (1914) 217 Mass. 462, 105
N. E. 605, L. R. A. 1915B 144, the court strongly approves that case. The
opinion in this case points out that Gresham v. Walsh, (1915) 76 Ore.
272, 147 Pac. 534, does not hold that a payee cannot be a holder in due
course but simply that he was not in that case because the remitter had
such knowledge of defenses as to destroy that character and this remitter
was the agent of the payee bank which was consequently affected with
notice through him.
In Washington in State Bank of Connell v. Pac. Grain Co., (1923)
125 Wash. 149, 215 Pac. 350, the plaintiff bank was held to be the holder
in due course of a draft in which it was named as payee where it had
acquired the instrument as a bona fide purchaser.
In Ladd & Tilton Bank v. Small, (1923) 126 Wash. 8, 216 Pac. 862,
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Opposed to this narrower view are Massachusetts,5 4 Pennsyl60
59
5
7
vania," New York, 56 Alabama, Illinois, Tennessee, Idaho,
62
Vermont61 and Montana. 63
Editors and writers seem to be agreed for the most part that
a payee of a negotiable instrument should be regarded as eligible
to the status of holder in due course, if he qualifies in other respects and they appear to regard this view as representing not only
the better reasoning but the weight of authority and even in those
cases where the instrument left the maker in incomplete form and
was fraudulently filled up by the intermediate party before being
sold to the payee as was the case in all of the cases heretofore described in detail, including Herdinan v. Wheeler, Lloyd's Bank
v. Cooke and Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk. Prof. Chaffee says :64
"The payee seems a holder in due course in such a situation
(viz.: where section 52 N. I. L. is otherwise satisfied) and should
the court said that the payee of a check was not a holder in due course
under the statutes but the case cannot be cited for the proposition that a
payee is not in due course as the remark by the court to this effect was
entirely obiter and the decision was for the payee, he having proved that
he bought the instrument without notice.
"Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, (1914) 217 Mass. 462, 105 N. E. 605,
L. R. A. 1915B 144; Boston Steel and Iron Co. v. Steuer, (1903) 183
Mass. 140, 66 N. E. 646; Colonial Fur Ranching Co. v. First Nat. Bank,
(1917) 227 Miss. 12, 116 N. E. 731. Other cases cited Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law, 3rd Ed., 52.
'Johnson v. Knipe, (1918) 260 Pa. St. 504, 105 AtI. 705, L. R. A.
1918E 1042.
'Brown v. Rowan, (1915) 91 N. Y. Misc. 220, 154 N. Y. S. 1098;
Bergstrom v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., (1917) 171 App. Div. 776, 157 N. Y.

S. 959; Id. 220 N. Y. 569, 115 N. E. 1033.

'Ex parte Goldberg & Lewis, (1914) 191 Ala. 356, 67 So. 839, L. R. A.
1915F 1157.
'Drumm Construction Co. v. Forbes, (1922) 305 Ill. 303, 137 N. E. 225.
'Figures v. Fly, (1917) 137 Tenn. 358, 193 S. W. 117; Snyder v.
McEwen, (1923) 148 Tenn. 430, 256 S.W. 434.
'Redfield v. Wells, (1918) 31 Ida. 415, 173 Pac. 640, but see Consolidated Wagon Co. v. Housman, (Idaho 1923) 221 Pac. 143 where the
note was indorsed in blank by defendant and filled out contrary to instructions held following Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk that payee could not
be holder in due course. Redfield v. Wells was not cited.
'Howard Nat. Bank v. Wilson, (1923) 96 Vt. 438, 120 At. 889.
"Merchants Nat. Bank of Billings v. Smith, (1921) 59 Mont. 280, 196
Pac. 523, 15 A. L. R. 430.
'Other cases to this effect will be found referred to in Brannan, The
Negotiable Instruments Law, 49-56.
In Minnesota this question has apparently not been adjudicated but see
note in 6 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 406, where it is stated that the Minnesota court has assumed in State Bank v. Missia, (1920) 144 Minn. 410, 175
N. W. 614, that the named payee might be a holder in due course, although
in the case cited the named payee failed to establish that he had acted in
good faith. See also Security Bank v. Foster, (Tex. 1923) 249 S.W. 227.
"Progress of the Law-Bills and Notes, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 255-71.
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be protected as much as an indorsee. Pennsylvania has recently
so held in accordance with the weight of authority."- 5
Prof. Brannan also takes this view,66 carefully analyzing a
number of the stronger cases on both sides of the controversy.
He has furthermore helpfully pointed out that several of the cases
sometimes cited as applying the rule unfavorable to the payee do
not refer to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law or were
actually decided on other grounds.
There are a number of notes in the legal periodicals dealing
with some of the principles of law involved in this problem. These
notes are especially valuable for the analysis of the particular cases
reviewed and for their collection of authorities in particular
67
states.
On the other hand an elaborate note in American Law Reports 6s disagreeing with the case to which it is appended6 9 concludes that, "....
the weight of authority is quite evenly divided"
and proceeds to express the opinion that "a logical construction
of the Negotiable Instruments Law supports the conclusion
reached by those courts which hold that a payee cannot be a holder
70
in due course." A later note appears in American Law Reports
which in a degree retracts the broad statement above quoted and
asserts:
"The true criterion of a decision as to the right of the payee
of a negotiable instrument to recover of the maker thereof, free
from defenses the maker had against other parties to the transaction out of which the note arose, is to view the transaction as
a whole, and if the payee is an innocent person who has parted
with a considerationon the faith of the note, he is entitled to hold
it free from equities which the maker has against other parties to
the transaction."
In short this editor has arrived at exactly the same conclusion
as Lord Justice Fletcher-Moulton did in Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke,
'Johnston v. Knipe, (1918) 260 Pa. St. 504, 105 Atl. 705, L. R. A.
1918E 1042.
'See reference in note 63 above.
'10 Cal. L. Rev. 413; 17 Col. L. Rev. 566; 15 Harv. L. Rev. 579; 15 Id.
596; 30 Id. 515; 32 Id. 855; 36 Id. 751; 20 Mich. L. Rev. 908; 21 Id. 591; 1
MINNESOTA LAW REvIEW 446; 6 Id. 156; 6 Id. 406; 64 U. Pa. L. Rev. 318;
70 Id. 52.
The above are among the more valuable of the notes of this charac-

ter which have been consulted in connection with the preparation of this
afticle.
6115 A. L. R. 437.
'Merchants National Bank of Billings v. Smith, (1921)
280, "021
196 A.
Pac.L.523.
R. 1365.

59 Mont.
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and the leading American cases which support the payee, and by
his device of calling this payee "an innocent person who has parted
with consideration, etc.," has avoided admitting in terms that he
is a holder in due course.
The various encyclopedic texts touch upon this question in
a very limited fashion, but far better collections of the authorities
will be found in Brannan on Negotiable Instruments and in the
71
annotations above referred to.

Probably the strongest American authorities for the proposition that a payee may be a holder in due course under the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law are the well known Massachusetts
cases of Boston Steel and Iron Co. v. Steuer,'2 and Liberty Trust
Co. v. Tilton,73 The Steuer Case was decided in 1903, the year
after Herdman v. Wheeler, 4 which was cited in the opinion but
not followed. The drawer of the check in this case handed it to
her husband to be delivered to the payee in payment of a debt owed
by her to the payee. The husband fraudulently delivered it as payment of a debt which he himself owed to the payee. The payee
took it as such in good faith. It was held that the payee was
a holder in due course of this check which was completed before
it was offered to the plaintiff-payee. The Massachusetts court discussed but refused to follow Herdnzan v. Wheeler and expressly
stated that the plaintiff was a holder in due course under section
52 of the uniform act (section 69 in the Massachusetts statute).
13 R. C. L. 1031, under the section heading "What constitutes holding
in due course": "The fact that a person is the payee of a negotiable
security does not prevent him from becoming a bona fide purchaser of
it at common law, with all the rights incident to a purchaser for value
without notice," citing in this connection Boston Steel and Iron Co. v.
Steuer, (1903) 183 Mass. 140, 66 N. E. 646, a case clearly holding that a
payee could be a holder in due course under the N. I. L. This passage
proceeds in the same tenor citing- two cases prior to N. I. L. and then
proceeds to say: "But the term 'holder in due course' as employed in the
Negotiable Instruments Law should be construed to apply only to one
who takes the instrument by negotiation from another who is the holder,
it should not be held to include the person to whom the instrument is
made payable." The only case cited as authority for this statement is
Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, (1907) 135 Ia. 350, 112 N. W. 807, 13 L. R. A.

(N.S.) 490.

This question is however fairly satisfactorily dealt with in the R. C. L.
supplement Vol. I, page 950.
At 8 Corpus Juris 468 the subject is referred to in the text and dealt
with somewhat more fully in the notes pages 468-70.
"(1903) 183 Mass. 140, 66 N. E. 646, 91 A. S. R. 426.
"(1914) 217 Mass. 462, 105 N. E. 605, L. R. A. 1915B 144.
"[1902] 1 K. B. 361, 71 L. J. K. B. 270, 86 L. T. 48, 18 T. L. R. 190,
50 W. R. 300.
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This case stood as the leading exponent of its doctrine until 1914
when the rule was reiterated in Massachusetts in Liberty Trust
Co. v. Tilton, in which the opinion much more fully discussed the
application and meaning of the various sections of the Negotiable
Instrument Law involved in a full consideration of the problem
both in connection with instruments which left the hands of the
maker in complete form and where, as was the fact in the principal
case, the instrument was fraudulently completed between the time
it left the maker and the time it was offered to the plaintiff as
payee. This case presents what is probably the- best reasoned
opinion to be found on this point and one which is cited and quoted
at length in many of the subsequent decisions.
It is not the writer's purpose to go into great detail in stating
the line of reasoning followed in the cases holding that a payee
may be a holder in due course even of an instrument which was
incomplete when it left the hands of the maker drawer acceptor
or irregular indorser. This reasoning which seems to the writer
unanswerable, is reiterated in the cases and will be found most
75
admirably set forth by Prof. Brannan.
Briefly this line of reasoning may be summarized as involving
three primary steps:
1. The word "negotiated," as used in the last sentence of
section 52 of the Uniform Act and also in section 14, does not
necessarily mean indorsement only but may include transfer or
issue of the instrument to any person who is otherwise a holder in
due course for the purpose- of investing him with the absolute right
to hold, retransfer or collect the same.
2. The provisions of section 30 (N. I. L.) particularly the
last sentence, describe a method, but not necessarily the only
method by which negotiation may be accomplished.
3. Section 59 (N. I. L.) wherein it is stated, that every
holder is deemed prima facie "to be a holder in due course," taken
together with section 191, which defines "holder," as either "payee
or indorsee in possession" clearly indicates it to be the intent of
the act, taken as a whole, that a payee should be regarded as a potential holder in due course and therefore entitled to the same protection as any other holder who qualifies as such in other respects
under the provisions of section 52.
Two of the more recent cases on the problem which have re"Brannan, The Negotiable Instruments Law, pages 49-56 and 162.
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ceived some attention are Bank of Commerce v. RandellT " already
7
referred to, and Britton Milling Co. v. Williams,"
decided in South
Dakota in 1921. The Nebraska case following the dictum in Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk,78 which is referred to in the opinion
almost with veneration, takes the position that a holder payee may
be a holder in due course under the particular and limited circumstances stipulated in the opinion, and referred to as the third of the
classifications mentioned earlier in this discussion, namely, that
such payee has taken the instrument "from a holder (not the
maker) to whom it was negotiated as a completed instrument." In
short, the payee who receives a bank draft from a purchasing
remitter in the ordinary way, is a holder in due course, and so,
likewise, is any payee who gets the instrument under these ordinary circumstances. Under this doctrine which is essentially the
ground left to the payee to stand upon by the dicta in the Vander
Ploeg Case and in Herdzan v. Wheeler, a bona-fide-purchaserpayee is safe only where the paper itself has nothing shady in its
past. In other words the payee is charged with responsibility for
the secret history of the instrument in respect to such matters as
are dealt with in sections 14 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law. If the instrument was incomplete when it left the hands
of the principal obligor, then the payee is not a holder in due
course, not because he has failed to give value or acted in bad faith
or knows anything about this, but merely because he is the payee;
likewise if the instrument was complete but was delivered without
authority the payee, merely because he is such, comes within the
defense afforded by the first part of section 16 but not within the
reservation in favor of holders in due course in the latter part of
the section.
7
Britton Milling Co. v. Willianms
was decided in South Dakota
in 1921 on facts essentially similar to those involved in the Nebraska case and which in Nebraska or, if we may trust the dictum in the Vander Ploeg Case, even in Iowa, would have permitted
the payee to recover. However it would seem that South Dakota
is committed unqualifiedly to the proposition that a payee can never
be a holder in due course, because he does not take the instrument by negotiation. And in South Dakota the word is taken in
its narrow meaning as quite synonymous with "endorsement."
'(1922)
2T(1921)
"(1907)
"(1921)

107 Neb. 332, 186 N. W. 70, 21 A. L. R. 1365.
44 S. D. 464, 184 N. W. 265, 21 A. L. R. 1353.
135 Ia. 350, 112 N. W. 807, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 490.
44 S. D. 464, 184 N. W. 265, 21 A. L. R. 1353.
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In the Nebraska case the defendant made a note payable to the
plaintiff in payment for certain shares of stock which defendant
purchased from one McClaran and the note was in complete form
delivered by the defendant to McClaran who thereafter sold it to
the Plaintiff bank, presumably for value, in good faith and without notice of McClaran's fraud which the defendant now asserts.
The court held that plaintiff as payee might nevertheless be a
holder in due course under the Negotiable Instruments Law and
following the interpretation of the word "negotiated" as suggested
in Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton.Y'
In the Soutb Dakota case the defendant gave a note for the
purchase of stock in a corporation which was organized to take
over the plaintiff's business, but made the note payable to the plaintiff which received it from tlve corporatioon in good faith for value
and before maturity in part payment for the business. Plaintiff
sued the defendant, who set up as a defense fraud on the part of
the corporation's agent in connection with the sale of the stock for
which the note was given. Held, plaintiff cannot be a holder in
due course because the note was not negotiated to him and hence
he cannot recover.
Nebraska was the one state which prior to the adoption of the
uniform law had clearly taken the position that a payee, because
of his character as such, could not be a holder in due course.s As
pointed out in the comment on this case in the Michigan Law
Review, it is gratifying at least for the sake of uniformity to see
Nebraska adopting the prevailing view. 8 2 This review seems to
overlook the extent of the limitation which the Nebraska court
puts upon the broader rule of such cases as Liberty Trust Co.
v. Tilton in situations involving section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law where the instrument left the hands of the party sought
to be charged still containing blanks which were later fraudulently
filled or tampered with before reaching the payee.8 3 The same
limitation would apply to instruments delivered without the authority of the obligor sought to be charged. In other words the
Nebraska case only decides in favor of the payee because he has
8(1914) 217 Mass. 462, 105 N. E. 605, L. R. A. 1915B 144.
'See reference to these cases in note 31.
'20 Mich. L. Rev. 908.
'In truth all the "pre-statute" cases in Nebraska were cases of incomplete or technically undelivered instruments and Nebraska has not by the
more recent decision changed the law at all so far as it had been announced
in connection with facts involved in the earlier cases.
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got an instrument which was completed and delivered by the
maker, and by dictum indicated that it would follow Vander Ploeg
v. Van Zuuk under similar facts. The court says in the course of
its opinion:
"Pothoven (in the Vander Ploeg Case) was not the bearer of
a completed note. Under the law merchant the plaintiff would
have been a holder in due course. The Negotiable Instruments
Law has changed the law in this respect, as it deals with completed
instruments only."
The South Dakota court, on the other band, having no local
precedents, followed the language of Herdman v. Wheeler and
Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk and decided against the payee merely
because he had not taken the instrument by negotiation, employing
the word negotiation in the limited sense of meaning endorsement.
The effect of the South Dakota decision therefore is that the payee
of a negotiable instrument cannot be a holder in due course under
any circumstances. In short "the South Dakota case has followed
the general rule of the Iowa case but overlooked the exception
there made of a case on all fours with the facts of Britton Milling
Co. v. Williams.""4 The Nebraska court referred to Britton Milling Co. v. Williams but dismissed it with the comment that it is
"based on a misunderstanding of the Iowa case and also the Herdman Case cited therein and is contrary to the weight of authority."
There is however something to be said for the correctness of
the decision in Britton Milling Co. v. Williams, something which,
so far as the writer has bejn able to discover, has been overlooked
by the South Dakota Court in both the Britton Milling Co. Case
and in Tripp State Bank v. Jerke which followed it, as well as by
all the critics who have commented upon the decision. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was adopted in South Dakota
with certain modifications of the uniform draft. There is in the
light of these variations, at least the suggestion that the South
Dakota court has effectively, if perhaps unconsciously, voiced the
intent of the local legislature.
Instead of adopting section 14 of the uniform act, the legislature of South Dakota substituted the following :85
"One who makes himself a party to an instrument intended to

"6MINFNSOTA
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'S. D. Revised Code 1919, section 1718. This was taken verbatim
from earlier South Dakota statutory compilations. For this Provision and
the ancestor of the South Dakota substitute for section 16 as found in
the uniform N. I. L., see S. D. Revised Codes 1877, sections 1852, 1853,
1854, and also Compiled Laws 1887, sections 4487, 4488, 4489.
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be negotiable, but which is left wholly or partly in blank for the
purpose of filling afterwards is liable upon the instrument to an
indorsee thereof in due course, in whatsoever manner and at whatsoever time it may be filled, so long as it remains negotiable in
form."
It will be noticed that South Dakota has by this wording evidently retained the American doctrine which existed prior to the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law relative to the authority
of the due course holder of a negotiable instrument to fill blanks,
but by very express language has limited that power to a particular
kind of due course holder, namely an indorsee.
Again in section 16 of the uniform act, as adopted in South
Dakota, the third paragraph beginning with the word "but" and
.ending with the word "presumed" is omitted and the following
sentence is substituted :88
"An endorsee of a negotiable instrument in due course acquires
an absolute title thereto, so that it is valid in his hands, notwithstanding any provision of law making it generally void or voidable, and notwithstanding any defect in the title of the person from
whom he acquired it."
Here is the language, in these two sections, in which the South
Dakota statute defines what are probably the highest rights of the
most favored owner of a negotiable instrument. That language
is in clear terms applicable only to an "endorsee." The legislature
has deliberately and designedly altered the wording of the uniform
draft of the Negotiable Instruments Law and has substituted other
wording expressive of the law as it wa5 intended to be in South
Dakota.
It follows that, at least so far as concerns paper which left the
obligor while incomplete, or which was delivered without authority,
the "holder" who is to enjoy the special protection accorded to
bona-fide purchasers of commercial paper is the "endorsee" only
and not every "holder in due course."
This statute then virtually enacts the doctrine of Vander Ploeg
v. Van Zuuk and the rule which would probably be followed in
Nebraska in dealing with incomplete or fraudulently delivered
instruments since the decision in Bank of Commerce v. Randell.
Hence even though Britton Milling Co. v. Williams had been
decided the other way, the statute would have required the South
Dakota court to follow Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk upon its facts.
It is reasonable to surmise that to the South Dakota court, used
to dealing with the above peculiar local provision of the statute
"S. D. Revised Code 1919, section 1720.
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governing negotiable instruments, a holder in due course seemed
so palpably an "endorsee" only, that it was taken for granted. It
is to be regretted that, if the court arrived at its decision in Britton Milling Co. v. Williams on this basis, the opinion did not so
state. Without this explanation the cases of Britton Milling Co.
v. Williams and Tripp State Bank v. Jerke 7 cannot be explained
at all, and, even with this special local legislation in mind, it is to
be questioned whether the use of the word "indorsee" in the way
in which it is used in sections 14 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law as it now stands in the statutes of South Dakota, makes
it fair to infer that the same limited meaning must be given to the
expression "holder in due course" where it occurs elsewhere in the
act and where South Dakota has not departed from the uniform
draft.
The importance, from the standpoint of commercial expediency, of holding that a payee may be a holder in due course is
apparent and this advantage has been pointed out in many decisions, particularly among the more recent ones. One notices that
the law is favorable to the payee in those states in which are located
the greatest financial and commercial centers of the country; those
cities where the vast volume of commercial-paper transactions
take place and in which are found the great reservoirs of credit
supplying the market which takes up negotiable instruments originating in the more purely agricultural or industrial communities
and exceeding the sum of local banking power available for their
absorption. In Iowa, or South Dakota or Nebraska, the majority
of the credit operations involving the transfer of commercial instruments are probably carried out between farmers and local
banks. The parties involved are to a large degree familiar with
each other's business affairs, or at all events can inform themselves
without serious loss of time or great inconvenience. The local
banker to whom is offered an instrument for discount can more
readily find out all about the transactions connected with its execution and delivery and its subsequent history, than can the banker
or wholesale merchant in a great city whose accounts contain hundreds of names in many states. This difference in point of view
has to some extent, although perhaps unconsciously, reflected itself
in the private opinions of the bench and bar, in a jurisdiction
where either the one or the other of these conditions exists, and
ultimately this attitude of the legal profession becomes crystallized
in the form of a judicial utterance.
-*(1922) 45 S. D. 448, 187 N. W. 314.

